Abstract: Nowadays, the risk analysis of critical systems cannot be focused only on a technical dimension. Indeed, well-known accidents in nuclear or aerospace areas underlined initiating causes also related to technical and organizational viewpoints. This led to the development of methods for risk assessment considering three main aspects on the system resources: the technical process, the operator constraining the process, and the organization constraining human actions on the process. However, only few scientific works have tried to join these methods in a unique and global approach. Thus this paper focuses on a methodology that aims to achieve the integration of the different methods in order to assess the risks probabilistically. The integration is based on (a) system knowledge structuring and (b) its unified modelling by means of Bayesian networks also supporting quantification and simulation phases. The methodology is applied to an industrial case to show its feasibility and to draw conclusions regarding the model relevance for system risk analysis. The results of the methodology can be used by decision makers to prioritize their actions when faced with potential or real risks.
INTRODUCTION
Risk, and more particularly accidental risk, is an inherent notion of all operating industrial systems. It has been studied for many years and the identification of its causes tends nowadays to a diversification. Indeed, until the 1970s, the risk studies were centred on technical aspects of systems [1] . Then several major accidents, such as the Three Mile Island nuclear accident and the Bhopal catastrophe, underlined complementary causes addressing operator errors and organizational dysfunctions. These accidents allowed the scientific community to propose, in the 1980s, the first methods centred on the analysis of these human errors. This led to the human reliability analysis area being expanded with methods such as THERP [2] , CREAM [3] , ATHEANA [4] , and so on. In addition, in the 1990s, other accidents (for example the Challenger explosion and the Chernobyl nuclear accident) emphasized the importance of organizational dysfunctions in accident occurrences, thereby contributing to the emergence of different theories for organizational issue study such as the normal accident [5] and the high-reliability organizations [6] . A main consequence has been that the risk analysis evolved to cover the whole of these causes (technical, human, and organizational). This is particularly true for critical installations (such as nuclear power plants, chemical processes, and so on) for which regulations become more and more drastic according to safety rules. Nevertheless these types of analyses are often difficult to achieve owing to the volume of the required resources to be developed and the management hesitation. Therefore the deployment of such analyses is mandatory correlated with an adapted methodology. This methodology has to propose knowledge structuring, knowledge unification, and also demonstrative aspects (for decision makers). Recent scientific works discuss this issue but generally in a partial way (i.e. focused on specific system resources) or for specific industrial sectors. Reference [7] presents a qualitative demonstration; reference [8] focuses on learning processes; reference [9] studies the French railroad company, while reference [10] focuses on chemical systems. References [11] to [13] concentrate on nuclear power plants while the focus of reference [14] is workload prediction. To address these gaps, it is proposed to develop a methodology based on generic concepts (i.e. not sector-based) with an emphasis on knowledge structuring and unification to handle technical, human, and organizational aspects in the same and unique model. This methodology aims to enable a probabilistic estimation of risky scenarios occurrence by considering safety barrier impacts on the system and on its performance. Indeed, safety barriers are defined as key elements in the risk prevention field because they hold a critical position in the system operation [15] . Then human and organizational changes can be studied by means of these safety elements in order to identify and anticipate critical situations. The proposition of a probabilistic approach is done by using Bayesian networks [16] . This modelling tool allows the merging of different kinds of probabilistic knowledge with no Boolean variables and uncertainties propagation in one model. This innovative methodology results from collaboration between a research centre (CRAN), a French end-user operating conventional and nuclear power plants (EDF), and the French National Institute for Industrial Environment and Risks (INERIS).
The methodology proposed in the paper is addressed as follows: section 2 defines methodology phases, principles, and characteristics. Subsequently, methods for knowledge collection and extraction are developed for each system dimension. Then section 3 proposes techniques for system knowledge identification and extraction, leading in section 4 to unifying this knowledge by means of Bayesian networks. The methodology feasibility is illustrated in section 5 with an application on a risky scenario resulting from the operation of a chemical process. Finally some conclusions and perspectives are developed.
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
Based on systemic principles [17] , the proposed methodology is organized with the following phases [18] .
1. Definition of system limits: consists in specifying the system characteristics and the contextual ones to be studied in this analysis.
2. Knowledge extraction: leads to an identification of adequate methods to be used to collect information in each dimension identified in the previous stage. 3. Knowledge unification: aims to define a shared representation of these different kinds of information that enables thereafter their aggregation in a risk model. 4. Risk model construction: consists in building a model based on the right modelling technique and allowing the studies of risky scenarios. In the proposed approach, different kinds of knowledge should be merged in the same risk model by means of Bayesian networks.
Considering the key role of safety barriers to prevent risky scenarios' occurrence [19] , it is also required to model the operation of these system safety components.
1. Definition of barrier models: enables convenient modelling of these safety elements to be depicted, based on generic and partial models.
Estimation of barriers effectiveness and their
impacts on the system: consists in using the model to simulate scenarios in order to classify risks, to prioritize strategies and investments.
System dimensions
To identify the limits of the studied system, it is proposed to define a conceptual framework (Fig. 1 ). This framework enables the characterization of studied system dimensions and their interactions. It is based on principles developed in reference [20] , which specify that 'an important feature of this model is that management factors affect the physical system only through human decisions and actions'. In the proposed framework ( Fig. 1, [21] ), the system is broken down into three representative layers and influenced by two contextual layers [22] [23] [24] : the technical layer, the actions layer, the organizational layer, the organizational context (context in which the system is evolving in relation to factors such as social, regulations, competition), and the natural environment context (such as the evolution of the physical and natural climate depending on weather data, geographical implantation, and so on).
These layers interact through three kinds of exchanges defined as follows:
(a) horizontal exchange -in the same abstraction layer; (b) vertical exchange -between two contiguous abstraction layers; (c) transactional exchange -between a system abstraction layer and a contextual one (Fig. 1) .
The transactional exchange is defined because system variables have different characteristics than contextual variables. Indeed, the first variables can be controlled while the second variables influence the system but are undergone.
KNOWLEDGE COLLECTION AND EXTRACTION
On the basis of the system dimension definition, it is necessary to select adequate methods to represent them in a risk analysis objective. Thus, in the scope of risks estimation (step E), an identification of similarities between technical risk analyses (defined in reference [25] ) and human/organizational analyses ( Fig. 2) underlines that it is necessary to define goals to be reached (steps A and B). Then field theories need to be identified to use the adequate methods to collect information (step C) and to propose a shared representation of the studied system (step D). These items are addressed in this section to characterize each system dimension, through a bottom-up approach as depicted in Fig. 1 .
Action a Action b
Actions layer Many methods can be used to study technical failures (FMEA, HAZOP, fault trees, event trees, reliability diagrams, and so on). The choice depends mainly on the study aims [1] . Thus, in this approach, it is proposed to use the bow-tie method ( Fig. 3 and Table 1 , developed in the European project ARAMIS [26] ). Indeed, the bow-tie method enables the description of an accident scenario occurrence by each path from initiators to final consequences. This is done by graphically aggregating a deductive method through a fault tree and an inductive one through an event tree [12] . Moreover for assessing the risk level of events (CE, ME . . . in Table 1 ), this aggregation is achieved in a probabilistic computation. Concerning safety barriers, they are represented by means of vertical bars ( Fig. 3 ) in order to generate opposition to the accident scenario development. The barrier depiction proposed in this method has to be specified for the global issue considering the study of their operation and impacts on the system.
The barrier notion
A safety barrier is an entity implemented within the system to avoid the occurrence of a risky scenario by preventing/limiting the critical event occurrence (prevention barrier) or by reducing consequences of this event (protection barrier) [22] . These entities are composed either of a safety instrumented system (SIS) or of a safety device (SD, active or passive). A SIS is a barrier needing external activation. This barrier type is composed of three subsystems [19] (as defined in reference [27] ): detection (sensors), processing (logic solvers), and action (final elements).
These subsystems can be composed of technical components and/or operators ( Table 2 ). An active SD is a barrier needing a mechanical system to develop an action (safety pressure, valve) but without external source of energy. In addition, a passive SD is a permanent barrier without human action, energy source, or information source. In this approach, SD barriers are considered as a particularization of SIS barriers because they are usually composed of one technical subsystem.
Considering the fact that these barriers (SIS and SD) are composed of, at least, a technical device, they can then prevent a scenario occurrence if they are available [12] . The availability is defined in reference [28] as the 'ability of an item to be in a state to perform a required function under given conditions at a given instant of time or during a given time interval, assuming that the required external resources are provided'. It is a function of intrinsic data (which are purely technical and represented by manufacturer's data) and contextual data (which represent human and organizational influences on these intrinsic data).
The human dimension

Action classes
During the study of the system functioning, it has been observed that the availability of any technical component is acted upon human actions. These actions are gathered into two categories:
(a) the maintenance actions (defined as the 'combination of all technical, administrative and managerial actions during the life cycle of an item intended to retain it in, or restore it to, a state in which it can perform the required function' [28] ); (b) the control actions (allowing the system to properly operate).
In this methodology, indirect influences are characterized by maintenance actions and direct ones by control actions [21, 29] . This configuration is justified because the system availability, ensured by the effectiveness of maintenance actions, depends on its production capacity (or operability), ensured by the effectiveness of control actions. These actions' effectiveness have to be quantitatively assessed according to principles developed in the human factors field.
The human factors can be studied through two fields which have different characteristics and aims: ergonomics and human reliability (the International Human Reliability Analysis Empirical Study (www. ife.no/main_subjects_new/mto/), proposes several relevant research works). However in relation to the aim of estimating the effectiveness of specific human actions, the objective is not to characterize the human-system interaction and its influence on the action effectiveness, but mainly to qualify the impact of the organization on the action effectiveness. This system configuration implies to identify human reliability concepts.
Human reliability can be defined as the ability of a human operator to perform a required mission under given conditions during a given time interval. It concerns the analysis and impact of humans on the reliability and safety of systems [30] , by considering human actions not only as a source of error [31] but also as a source of performance [32] . This enlarges the classical human task analyses area [33] in which the details of individual behaviour mechanisms are not considered. This expansion is done by focusing on collective behaviours through an aggregation of the different individual behaviours acting together for the mission effectiveness. Thus, the proposed developments (representative variables, quantification method, and so on) are more based on principles developed in the human reliability field with a collective and quantitative point of view.
Representative variables
In the industrial context of this work, a comparison of methods used by the French Electricity Board nuclear branch (EDF) and the French National Institute for Industrial Environment and Risks (INERIS) has led to selection of the variables defined hereafter. Some of these indicators are related to the collective characteristics. dynamic, which is composed of rules (formal and informal) and work skills used by the collective to reach goals. It can be defined as the ability of a collective to fit a specific situation and to balance a potential drift. In addition, other variables are specific with the tools and procedures that are used by the collective to achieve its actions.
(Ai)
Aids, which represent the whole of the procedures (prescriptive and non-prescriptive documents) and tools (other documents and equipments) used by operators in support of their activity. 6. (Rws) Respect of work specifications. Work specifications hold information concerning the system, objectives to be reached and means making it possible to reach these goals. It is possible to fulfil these goals if this information has been correctly defined and if these objectives are achievable. 7. (Rtc) Real-time control, defined by controls (conformity evaluations by observations and judgements completed if necessary by measurements, tests or calibrations) and goals achievement (means used to appraise the visibility of action issues without considering means used to reach these issues). 8. (Fe) Feedback experience, which consists in capitalizing and exploiting information resulting from the analysis of positive and/or negative events.
The final variable concerns external factors that can influence the collective during actions achievement. 9. (Cf) Contextual factors, characterized by external elements influencing the studied action (lights, smog, other human actions in progress, and so on).
Considering differences between technical process operation and collective behaviours, it is proposed to study human influences on the technical process as external disturbances, in the sense that the technical system moves from a stable state (valid before the human intervention) to another stable state (valid after this human intervention). Between these stable states, the technical process evolves in a changing state [21, 29] .
Local features of studied systems
In relation to the technical process, this changing state principle is characterized by the fact that the subject (the collective) considers its action with the change of the object state (the safety component) and takes control of it temporarily [34] . This control is materialized by a physical contact (through instruments, tools) between subject and object. As a consequence, this contact brings to the subject the energy required for the object transformation. It leads to the conclusion, in the proposed approach, that each action is related to a specific component. Therefore it means clearly to identify the technical component, which is influenced by human actions. For example, an action cannot directly impact a physical phenomenon such as a tank explosion. This relationship has to be first represented with the tank availability (as defined in section 3.1.2) and then by adding human influences.
Concerning the human action, this change can be seen as a local organizational change, inspired by Lewin [35] and divided into three generic steps (Fig. 4) : the preparation, the execution, and the closing. This representation allows a knowledge structuring and can be helpful during and after interviews to control the information collection and to organize this information (Table 3) .
Some comments can be developed on the indicators defined in this section.
1. They are specific to an action, and must be defined for each action through activity analyses. 2. The whole of these characteristics aims at being exhaustive but can be adapted. Indeed, variables can be added or deleted for specific contexts. Two theories are at the root of the development of organizational factors for hazardous systems. They are named the 'normal accident theory' (NAT) and the 'high reliability organizations' (HRO). The first theory is based on the 'idea that in some technological systems, accidents are inevitable or normal' owing to the combination of 'interactive complexity and tight coupling' which 'determine a system susceptibility' to unforeseen or prevented accidents. The second theory is defined 'as the subset of hazardous organizations that enjoy a record of high safety over long period of time' [36] . These fields define basically different views concerning socio-technical systems evolution leading to different representations for organizational factors. Nowadays, there exist different scientific contributions that propose to define these factors [37] . From a first survey based on references [38] to [42] , over 30 different factors can be identified. Nevertheless these factors are related 'to the safe, normal, routine operation of an organization that manages risk. At no time is the question of accidents and their teachings mentioned, although they are clearly characteristic of the safety of which the aim is to avoid accident'. Thus, it is proposed to use (in the methodology) the medical metaphor [37, 40] defined as follows: 'for determining if an organization is in good health, it is far simpler to know the causes of the sicknesses . . . It is more accessible to define a set of pathogenic organizational factors than to exhaustively list the organizational factors required and sufficient to ensure a good safety level within an organization'.
The chosen representation
In this way, a pathogenic organizational factor (POF) results from the aggregation of convergent signs that allow the characterization of a negative influence on the system safety. Seven organizational factors, issued from industrial case and accident report analyses, have been defined in a generic way [37] .
Among the seven factors, four of them are defined as follows. A system design is built on the definition and the integration of social and technical dimensioning hypotheses. These hypotheses are based on a description of the future system operation. Nevertheless some hypotheses could become out of date, that is inadequate to a new way of functioning. These hypotheses could also become false because the actual operating is proved different from the design one.
The three last factors are: shortcomings in the organization culture of safety (SOCS), difficulty in implementing feedback experience (DIFE), and production pressures (PP). Each of these factors is characterized by markers, signs, and symptoms that allow their identification during on-site investigations. Thus, they will be defined once for the whole studied system by means of an organizational analysis. This list of factors aims at being exhaustive but could be completed after further developments. Indeed, the definition of new pathogenic or resilient factors needs to study different incident and/or accident report analyses. (The resilience can be defined as the ability of a material or system to absorb change gracefully while retaining core properties or functions. For an organization, it is about ensuring that this organization is still able to achieve its core objectives in the face of adversity [43] .)
KNOWLEDGE UNIFICATION AND INTEGRATION
Safety studies with Bayesian networks
The modelling technique selected for unifying the knowledge coming from the three previous dimensions (technical, human, and organizational) is the Bayesian networks (BNs). BNs are directed acyclic graphs in which each node represents a variable, and each arc encodes conditional dependencies between these variables [44] . This formalism, initially developed to represent uncertain knowledge in artificial intelligence, has nowadays various application fields, e.g. marketing, industry, health, decision making, risk management, and so on (see www.bayesia.com, www. norsys.com, www.hugin.com/cases). More precisely, and in relation to the area in phase with the proposed methodology (safety of complex systems, risk assessment, and so on), different research works highlight that BNs are particularly well-suited [45] . The first item is about considering BN as a generalization of the tree formalism to deal with the complexity of studied systems. In reference [46] , the authors use the notion of polytrees, and in reference [47] the authors develop a method that allows the translation of fault trees into BNs (by using multi-state variables). The second item underlines works that use dynamic Bayesian networks (DBNs) to evaluate the reliability of complex systems. In references [48] and [49] , it is demonstrated how DBN can represent Markov chains to model system availability and reliability. In reference [50] , an evaluation of the reliability of technical systems based on the DBN formalism is proposed, and in reference [51] , the authors use dynamic object oriented Bayesian networks (DOOBNs) to evaluate reliability of complex systems. The last item is about a synthesis of different stages that enable the modelling of complex systems through BN in a reliability objective [45] . In addition, different approaches based on BN formalism are addressing the risk analysis of such complex systems. First, the considerations of exogenous variables allow the modelling to be closer to operating conditions of studied systems [52] . Second, references [11] , [14] , and [53] focus on the integration of human factors in the risk analysis process. Finally, references [12] and [54] propose an integration of organizational factors in the risk analysis process.
Thus, the choice of BN tool for the modelling aspect of the methodology is justified with the previous explanations but also in relation to the characteristics of the systems studied in this paper. The focus is now on the specifications of this technique knowing that [14] , 'since Bayesian networks precision is directly related to the prior knowledge embedded in them . . . it was imperative to provide a technique to accurately model the prior knowledge and the way is represented in the conditional probability tables (CPT)'.
Risk model development: human and organizational dimensions
Model objectives
In relation to the human and organizational dimensions, the main modelling objective consists in estimating the human action effectiveness considering its organizational context in order to enable an assessment of safety barriers availability [29] . The proposed model should allow the study of different kinds of impacts according to available information (themselves depending on the main subject of onsite investigations) such as impacts of the organization on the collective, impacts of the collective on action effectiveness and impacts of the organization on this effectiveness. This model is also developed, in case of critical situation diagnoses, to identify the most influent variables (i.e. the knowledge of some variables state allows isolation of the most influent causes in the studied situation). Then, information concerning an action can be obtained:
(a) by means of an analysis of the feedback experience and experts' judgements for a yet-implemented action; (b) by (direct or indirect) impacts of the organization and/or other yet-implemented actions (through their specific indicators) for a new action (not yet-implemented in the system operation, and with no feedback experience).
Impacts identification method
Possible influences between POF and human action variables have been identified on the basis of their local characteristics (signs and symptoms for POF, indicators and actions stages for human action variables). The approach (cf. Fig. 5 ) is defined in several steps as follows: identification of influences between indicators and signs/symptoms on the one hand and between action stages and signs/symptoms on the other hand (links 1 and 1'), justification of the presence (or absence) of influences between indicators and POF on the one hand and between action stages and POF on the other hand (links 2, 2', 3, and 3'). If the presence of influences can be justified, then links 4 and 4' are considered in the generic model. The method implementation, which consists in combining knowledge and experience of organizational and technical experts to identify and justify all the possible influences, leads to a generic configuration depicted in Table 4 . Indeed, experts involved in these analyses are considered as referent in their field domains owing to their theoretical and industrial backgrounds. This configuration is considered as generic because it has been defined in a general way (not dedicated to a specific range of applications) with the help of organizational experts addressing all the possible configurations. Some examples of the justification of the absence/presence of these influences in the generic model are given hereafter. Table 4 ) between 'NRDH' and 'Ex'. Experience is gained by observing the real system operation. Design hypotheses, defined during the system design or redesign, are not considered in this learning process. Table 4 ) between 'PP' and 'Execution'. If time, budgets, means, and resources are revised downwards with constant objectives, the execution stage might be hurriedly performed, by ignoring some critical steps. It can lead to risky situations.
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This influences identification allows the following observations:
(a) all the POF do not impact all the action indicators and stages; (b) all of these factors have at least an influence on one of the action indicators (or one of the action stages), i.e. all of these factors are represented in the model; (c) a limit of this method lies in meanings given to indicators, actions stages, and POF. Indeed, different meanings could lead to different configurations. This generic configuration is simplified for specific applications by removing influences.
Quantification method
At this stage, the Bayesian risk model (presented in Fig. 5(b) ) has to be up-graded with (a) information concerning variables modalities, (b) associated quantification method, and (c) conditional probability tables (CPT) structuring. In that way, two modalities have been defined for each group of (Boolean) variables. 
organizational factors (A) has not been proved; (P) has been proved.
For human action indicators: 'Present' (P) and
'Damaged' (D). It means that the considered indicator (P) meets action requirements; (D) does not meet (or meets in a partial way) these requirements. 3. For human action effectiveness and its stages:
'Effective' (E) and 'Ineffective' (I). It means that the considered variable (the human action or its stage) (E) fulfils the function for which it has been implemented in the system operation, (I) does not fulfil (or fulfils in a partial way) this function.
Then the associated quantification method is integrated in the model. It leads first to consider an initial configuration, for which the context is completely favourable. The probability of a variable Y to be in non-degraded state ('Effective' for action stages), knowing the non-degraded state of all of its parents, is settled at a 0 2 ð Þa function allowing the accumulation of worsening influences of parents X 1 and X 2 on the variable Y. It is proposed to consider f a 1ÀY ; ð a 2ÀY Þ ¼ a 1ÀY · a 2ÀY , which can be generalized by using the Noisy-Or gate principles because these variables are Boolean [12, 55] .
Thus, let Y be a node and X ¼ [ X i , the set of parents of Y (with i ¼ 1,2,3, . . ., n). Instead of defining the initial probability of the non-degraded modality of Y as equation (1) (as it is done in the binary Noisy-Or gate), it is proposed to introduce an uncertainty (due to considered variables, which are related to human actions and/or the organizational context) and then to define this probability by equation (2) .
Pðy x 1 j ; x 2 ; x 3 ; Á Á Á ; x n Þ ¼ a 0 with a 0 2 ½0; 1 leaky Noisy-Or ð2Þ
where, y is the non-degraded modality of Y, and y is its degraded modality; x i is the non-degraded modality of the parent X i , and x i is the degraded modality of this parent.
Moreover the probability of the non-degraded modality of Y, given that the ith parent is degraded, is defined in equation (3) .
j ; x 2 ; x 3 ; :::; x i ; :::;
where a i À Y 2 [0, 1] is the influence of the degraded state of the parent X i on the non-degraded state of Y. Finally, the probability of the non-degraded modality of Y, given X k X the subset of parents of Y that are in their degraded state, is specified in equation (4) with an innovative semantic (from the formula presented in reference [55] , p.169).
The '·' operator is used in this approach to support the consideration of the accumulative effect of different parents on a variable (i.e. if one parent is in its degraded state, it leads to a less critical situation than if two parents are in this state). Thus, the method enables a particularization of each influence identified between two variables. It means that the nondegraded modality column of the CPT relative to a variable Y (which can be an action indicator, stage or effectiveness) can be built by means of the following principle: for each n parents of the variable Y, all the previous combinatory is multiplied by the corresponding aggravation factor (in order to represent all degradations rules related to the parent).
Risk model development: technical and human dimensions
Model objectives
In relation to the technical and human dimensions, the main modelling objective consists in estimating the availability of safety technical components considering human and organizational contexts, and an evaluation of their impacts on the system (event occurrences, safety impacts, environment impacts, facilities impacts, and so on). The proposed model therefore allows impacts of human actions (maintenance and control actions) on the component availability to be represented. As defined previously, this model also enables, in case of critical situation diagnoses, an identification of most influent variables (i.e. the knowledge of some variables state would allow identification of the most influent parents in the studied situation). Then, information concerning a safety technical component can be obtained by means of manufacturer's data, analyses of the feedback experience and experts' judgements.
Generic models
As proposed in section 3.1.2, a barrier can be broken down into its technical components. This leads to a decomposition of its availability into 'detection availability', 'processing availability', and 'action availability' for SIS barriers type, or into 'technical component availability' for SD barriers type (Fig. 6 ). These variables (Fig. 6 ) are modelled with object oriented BN as described in reference [51] (holding an encapsulated BN). The generic models and associated quantification methods are developed in reference [21] and have been particularized for different applications as illustrated in section 5 (see later Fig. 11 and Fig. 13 ). The variable meanings are defined in Table 5 .
INDUSTRIAL APPLICATION
Industrial context of the studied installation
The studied system is a part of a chemical process which belongs to a classified installation. It produces plastic goods and it employs less than 100 people for a production capacity of £200 million per year. This industrial site is ISO 9001 [56] , ISO 14001 [57] , and OHSAS 18001 [58] certified. On-site investigations have emphasized:
(a) competitions between production shifts on the one hand, and with other companies on the other hand. (b) the subcontracting, due to a workforce cutting (and especially for executives) and an increasing of the workload which could lead to 'know-how' losses.
These observations result from reorganization strategic decisions made in the firm. For these reasons, organizational experts have identified three main POFs potentially impacting the functioning: 'SOCS' (shortcomings in the organizational culture of safety), 'PP' (production pressures), and 'NRDH' (no re-examining of the design hypotheses). These factors may contribute to the weakening of the system, which could eventually lead to a higher probability of risky situations in the future. The studied installation consists in the end product storage in silos (Fig. 7) , in which main components are: a nitrogen sensor, two level sensors, two temperature sensors, a water system, a filter, a hydraulic protection, and shielding braids.
Studied scenario
The modelling of this scenario requires information related to the dreaded physical phenomenon and the human and organizational specific configuration.
Technical dimension
In this installation, the main critical event is the silo explosion. Indeed, the remaining solvent that was used in the process can evaporate, leading to a flammable cloud. Besides, suspended combustive dusts (in this case: plastic dusts) may be disseminated. Hence, an explosion can occur because six conditions are simultaneously present (Fig. 8) . Three of them concern the product and the last three are related to the environment. When one of these conditions is missed (except for ones of the fire triangle), the explosion does not occur but the resulting ignition and fire will not be prevented.
Human and organizational dimensions
The information on this specific system has been gathered during on-site investigations. The investigations consist of developing interviews of executives and operators, achieved by technical and organizational experts. The information is used to depict the specific human and organizational configuration (Tables 6 and 7) , which is obtained by particularizing the generic configuration depicted in Table 4 (in section 4.2.2). Thus, in Tables 6 and 7 , the simplified configuration is described, keeping only the influences that are assigned a qualification (LI, I, II, TI). This means that 22 relations from the 37 initial ones are selected in Table 6 , and 15 relations in Table 7 . The following qualitative scale is used to assess each influence:
(a) LI (little impact): the effectiveness is slightly impacted by this pathogenic feature; (b) I (impact): the effectiveness is significantly impacted by this pathogenic feature; (c) II (important impact): it produces a tightly impact of this pathogenic feature on the effectiveness; (d) TI (total impact): it represents a total impact of this pathogenic feature on this effectiveness.
As defined in Table 3 the relationships between action indicators, their stages and their effectiveness are depicted in Tables 8 and 9 .
Scenario modelling
The scenario modelling is made up of three steps. The first one consists in the bow-tie construction, the second one is about its formalization with Bayesian networks, and the last one concerns the Bayesian model quantification.
Bow-tie representation
Risk analyses sessions have led by means of the ARAMIS method [26] to the bow-tie diagram shown in Figs 9 and 10. Safety barriers identified in these diagrams are:
(a) respect of procedures or maintenance operating modes; (b) continuous measurement of nitrogen concentration; (c) respect of ATEX equipment; (d) grounding (shielding braids); (e) elaboration and respect of fire permit; (f) filter.
Bayesian risk model
The resulting BN modelled by means of the BayesiaLab software (www.bayesia.com), is depicted in Fig. 13 . Within the model, the barriers 'a', 'c', and 'e' (Figs 9 and 10) are not directly represented. They are implicitly present in the characteristics (action indicators in Fig. 11 ) of barriers 'b' (SIS type), 'd' (SD type), and 'f'. Concerning the last barrier ('f'), its human and organizational contexts are not studied in this application. Indeed, on-site investigations have underlined the criticality of the barriers 'b' and 'd' but not of the barrier 'f' (no information was obtained concerning this barrier except for its presence in the system). Preparation  LI  LI  LI  ------LI  Execution  ---I  I  II  LI  --II  Closing  -------II  II I  II  I  ------II  Execution  ---II  I  II  TI  --TI  Closing  -------I  II The objects depicted in Fig. 11 (according to generic concepts developed in reference [21] ) model the following system features: (a) 'POF', for pathogenic organizational factors; (b) 'BC', for the barrier component models, which contain the technical component availability and influences of human actions on this availability; (c) 'AC', for actions characteristics, which contain indicators, stages, and action effectiveness.
Quantification
The qualitative construction of the risk model has to be assessed in order to make simulations and diagnoses.
Human and organizational dimensions. The quantification of this model part is structured in two stages. Technical dimension. The quantification of this model part is carried out by four stages.
Quantification of initiators (by using experts'
judgements and feedback experience analyses) (see Table 10 ).
Quantification of barrier components' CPT
(through the method developed in reference [21] ) (see Tables 11 and 12 
Simulations and diagnoses
On the basis of the quantified risk model, different configurations can be studied with the following hypothesis: it is considered that the nitrogen sensor and the shielding braids are present in the system, i.e. the decision variables 'Nitrogen_sensor_installation' and 'Shielding_braid_installation' (in Fig. 11 The second configuration is obtained by using conclusions issued from on-site investigations to make simulations. Thus the presence of the pathogenic organizational factors 'SOCS', 'PP', and 'NRDH' (cf. Table 13 ) are considered. These cases stress the following points.
1. If availabilities of barriers are considered, both 'production pressures' (for shielding braids) and 'no re-examining of the design hypotheses' (for oxygen detection barriers) have to be handled according to priority. This configuration is due to the fact that operators in charge of the calibration action are dedicated to this activity (maintenance staff), but the operators in charge of the supervision action have to accumulate this action with other ones (production staff). 2. If safety impacts are considered, however, no priority can be given for the handling of these organizational factors.
The third configuration is obtained by considering safety impacts as being 'Present' to make a diagnosis and then to identify most influent variables. It is necessary to study these different components more specifically. In this way, a first study can be achieved to identify major contributors of the unavailability of oxygen detection barriers, and more particularly on those related to the ineffectiveness of the sensor calibration. The results of this diagnosis situation, focused on the ineffectiveness of the sensor calibration, are presented in Table 14 . In this case, it is necessary to pay attention according to priority to the execution stage (E), the collective management and group dynamic (Cmgd), and the no re-examining of the design hypotheses (NRDH).
Sensitivity analysis
The results obtained with the proposed model need to be validated in order to draw conclusions regarding the relevance and quality of the model. In this way, a first step within validity procedure (first static step) is implemented with the methodology development because the model structure and its building are issued from systemic principles and experts' knowledge. This means that the modelling mechanisms are not only syntactic but also semantic. Moreover, the validation study concerns also the model variables and parameters, and can be achieved through a sensitivity analysis as proposed in reference [59] . Indeed reference [59] presents a methodology for knowledge engineering of BNs in which the sensitivity analysis is used to 'measure the sensitivity of changes in probabilities of query nodes when parameters and inputs are changed'.
Concerning the industrial application selected here, the focus is on sensitivity to findings and considers 'how the Bayesian network's posterior distributions change under different conditions'. A part of this analysis is depicted in Fig. 12 (the endpoint node considered is the sensor calibration effectiveness).
In Fig. 12 , nodes are listed from the least influential to the most influential. Horizontal bars highlight the variations of the sensor calibration effectiveness when the probability of its direct and indirect parent nodes is varied from 0 to 100 per cent.
This analysis confirms observations presented in Table 14 for the most important contributors of the action ineffectiveness, and for the overall classification of action stages and pathogenic organizational factors, but for items the prioritization is slightly different.
Indeed, variables identified as being highly sensitive to change (the most critical ones) are for each system dimension: the 'Execution' action stage, the item 'Cmgd', and the organizational factor 'NRDH'. Concerning the overall classification, different items must be emphasized:
(a) the ineffectiveness of the sensor calibration can be explained by a combination of its direct and indirect parents (action stages, items, and organizational factors); (b) the prioritization of action stages and organizational factors are similar in Table 14 and Fig. 12 ; these points confirm that the proposed BN accurately models the prior domain knowledge. The difference observed in the classification of items is attributable to the important number of correlations, which make these variables more sensitive to changes. It highlights the need for further developments concerning sensitivity analyses problems in order eventually to propose a dedicated method (based on behaviour analyses, mathematical approaches, and/or experts' judgements) for the analysis of the formalized model.
Conclusions on the application and its modelling
The application step leads to the following comments:
(a) the organizational factors 'PP' and 'NRDH' have to be handled as a priority; 'SOCS' should be studied thereafter; (b) about the sensor calibration, it is necessary to pay attention as a priority to its execution stage and its collective coordination; (c) a detailed study has to be conducted on the filter barrier to identify major human and organizational contributors to its unavailability; (d) specific studies must be done on initiators for assembly or re-assembly errors.
More generally, the proposed risk model makes it possible to identify, in one analysis, major contributors (initiators, safety barriers, human, and organizational weaknesses) for a specific target (e.g. the safety impact in section 5), and to be able to offer a complete set of solutions. In other words, it allows: (a) demonstration that direct causes of an accident occurrence can be explained by other causes (indirect), and that their treatment must be addressed collectively (i.e. by considering the whole causes and not only parts of them); (b) an ordering of technical and human events considering their criticality regarding the system safety, and then to make a choice regarding the events that have to be detailed.
These characteristics can help decision makers to anticipate critical situations and to prioritize their investments (economical, human, technical, and so on). 
CONCLUSION
The methodology presented in this paper allows the handling of a socio-technical system risk analysis in an integrated way. The integration is done step by step, owing to the degree of complexity of considered systems. The first step consists in identifying the system limits, allowing in a second step, the definition of adapted methods relative to knowledge collection of each system dimension (technical, human, and organizational). The method choice can be done only after a theoretical study because the way of analysing, representing, and quantifying all the considered dimensions can be very different. The third item concerns the proposition of methods that handle the unification issue in order to integrate these different dimensions in the same risk model. This proposal cannot be uncorrelated with the selected modelling tool, which is BNs in this methodology (owing to their characteristics: they deal with probabilistic and deterministic data, correlated variables, uncertainties, and so on). It then becomes possible to develop, in a generic way, models and associated quantification methods. The generic characteristics cover different activity sectors but require knowledge of the proposed methodology mechanisms and underlying concepts to be in a position to apply the methodology to a particular case. Finally, the application to a specific industrial system demonstrates the methodology's feasibility and validity. Indeed, observations of recurrent behaviours stress the robustness of the obtained results. Moreover, these results are coherent with observations made in the field.
The model built in this way highlights major contributors, by means of simulations and diagnoses, to a safety problem. It enables solutions to be proposed and/or further studies for these specific system elements (technical components, human actions, organizational factors). This tool can thus be useful for decision makers to anticipate critical situations, and to draw conclusions on prioritization of strategies and investments .
Nevertheless the methodology requires time and resources to collect data and to build the associated model. Its efficient development is therefore considered only for critical systems (nuclear power plants, chemical processes, and so on).
Currently, the proposed approach has several limitations needing further developments. These developments concern mainly the automation of the model building, the modelling of resilient characteristics of studied systems, and the consideration of how to model and measure uncertainties.
Some other items have to be thoroughly investigated in order to complete the proposed approach; these are: the definition of influence and quantification classes according to specific studied actions and components; the definition of influence and quantification classes according to specific organizational structures, actions, and processes; the consideration Fig. 13 Bayesian network of the 'silo explosion' scenario of human and organizational impacts not only through safety barriers but also as bow-tie initiators or events; the development of methods that allow a generalization of semi-quantitative scales used in such analyses; the development of methods for model validations (such as sensitivity analyses); and the application of the proposed methodology to other industrial cases in order to identify possible adaptations and simplifications (according to the activity, for example) and to build a dedicated feedback experience.
Concerning the last point, EDF currently applies the methodology to several specific cases (for the analysis of nuclear and hydraulic systems).
